a case an estoppel to revoke arises. *Clark v. Glidden,* 60 Vt., 702; *Rhodes v. Otis,* 33 Ala., 578. While on the other hand about an equal number hold that such expenditure of money does not render the license irrevocable. *Collins Co. v. Marcy,* 25 Conn., 239; *Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Railway,* 51 Minn., 304. But a license which is coupled with an interest in land is irrevocable. *Funk v. Haldeman,* 53 Pa. St., 229; *Long v. Buchanan,* 27 Md., 502.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—CHANGE OF GRADE—COMPENSATION—SETTING OFF BENEFITS.—IN RE BRADLEY, 125 N. Y. SUPP., 142.—*Held,* that in a proceeding to appraise damages for the change of grade of a village street, under Village Law (Consol. Laws, c. 64) § 159, benefits by the paving of the newly graded street cannot be set off against the damages done by the regrading.

At common law it is well settled that there is no liability for injuries caused by the damage done in changing the grade of a street. *Terre Haute v. Turner,* 36 Ind., 522; *Lee v. Minneapolis,* 22 Minn., 13. But in most states express provisions are made by legislative enactment for damages resulting from a change of grade. *Cummings v. Dixon,* 139 Mich., 269; *Comesky v. Village of Suffern,* 81 N. Y. Supp., 1049. Furthermore, it is well settled by common law, if not provided by statute, that if a particular property is benefited directly by a public improvement, the benefits may be set off against damages. *Seattle v. Methodist Protestant Church Bd. of Home Missions,* 138 Fed., 307; *Ft. Wayne v. Hamilton,* 132 Ind., 487. So, if the property is directly benefited as much as damaged, there can be no recovery. *Hopkins v. Ottawa,* 59 Ill. App., 288. However, the rule laid down in the principal case, that benefits which may be conferred by subsequent improvements cannot be set off against immediate damages, is in accord with the authorities. *Brucky v. Lake,* 30 Ill. App., 23; *Fuller v. City of Mt. Vernon,* 171 N. Y., 247. And in the same manner, future benefits are not to be set off against immediate damages. *Rudderow v. Philadelphia,* 166 Pa. St., 241. As to the benefits accruing to residence property from its increased value for business purposes. *Dallas v. Kahn,* 9 Tex. Civ. App., 19.

NEGLIGENCE—CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE—IMPUTATION.—BEAUCAGE V. MERCER, 92 N. E., 774 (MASS.).—*Held,* that contributory negligence of one party to a joint enterprise, including such an enterprise as use of an automobile, is imputed to the other, if within the scope of the enterprise.

Negligence in the conduct of another will not in general be imputed to the person injured, if he neither authorized such conduct nor participated therein nor had the right or power to control it. *Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Leach,* 117 Ill. App., 169; *Koplitz v. St. Paul,* 86 Minn., 373; *Laso v. Lancaster Co.,* 77 Nebr., 466. But if the act of a third person which contributed to the injury was, upon the principles of agency, or co-operation in a joint enterprise, the act of the person injured, recovery may be precluded. *Knightstown v. Musgrove,* 116 Ind., 121. In order to